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Abstract. Understanding and following safety standards with their text can be 
difficult. Ambiguity and inconsistency, among other issues, can easily arise. As 
a solution, several authors argue for the explicit representation of the standards 
with models, which can be created with semantic technologies such as 
ontologies. However, this possibility has received little attention. The few 
authors that have addressed it have also only dealt with a subset of safety 
standard aspects and have used technologies not usually applied for critical 
systems engineering. As a first step towards addressing these issues, this 
position paper presents our initial work on the representation of safety standards 
with Knowledge Manager, a tool used in industrial environments that exploits 
semantic technologies to manage domain information. The proposal also builds 
on prior work on the specification of safety compliance needs with a holistic 
generic metamodel. We describe how to use Knowledge Manager to specify the 
concepts and relationships of the metamodel for a given safety standard, and 
discuss the application and benefits of the corresponding representation. 
Keywords: safety-critical system, safety standard, representation of safety 
standards, ontology, model, Knowledge Manager.  
1 Introduction 
Most safety-critical systems must comply with safety standards as a way of assuring 
that they do not pose undue risks. Examples of these standards [7] include IEC 61508 
for a wide range of industries, DO-178C in avionics, EN 50128 in railway, and ISO 
26262 in automotive.  
Safety standards are typically large textual documents that consist of hundreds of 
pages and define thousands of criteria for compliance. The resulting complexity can 
hinder the comprehension of a standard. Ambiguity and inconsistencies are also usual 
in their text [6], and practitioners have indeed acknowledged issues in understanding 
and applying the standards [1][7]. This can lead to certification risks, as a system 
supplier might miss or misinterpret some criteria and thus not develop a compliant 
system. As a solution, several authors (e.g. [5]) argue that the use of structured 
representations of safety standards can help practitioners understand and follow them. 
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These representations have most often been UML or UML-based models such as a 
class diagram or a UML profile [2]. Nonetheless, the representations can also be 
developed with semantic technologies, e.g. as an ontology that includes the main 
concepts of a safety standard and the relationships between the concepts. Some 
authors have used this representation format in order to exploit semantic technology 
capabilities for safety assurance and certification. 
Gallina and Szatmári [3] propose the creation of ontology-based models to ease the 
comparison of safety standards. They represent ISO 26262 and EN 50128 with OWL 
2.0 and Protegé to later generate safety-oriented product lines in SPEM. The ontology 
focuses on the standards’ activities. Jost et. al [4] propose the formalisation of ISO 
26262 with an ontology to enable semi-automated selection of the standard’s 
requirements. This way, ISO 26262 can be tailored to a given project. Jost et al. 
combine OWL and SPEM, and manage the ontology with Protegé and Pellet, 
focusing on the standard’s terminology. Luo et al. [5] propose a model-based 
approach for compliance with safety standards and to facilitate assurance reuse. They 
use Protegé and OWLGrEd to specify and visualise, respectively, conceptual models 
of safety standards, and combine them with UML and SPEM. The approach is applied 
to ISO 26262, and the ontology focuses on the standard’s terminology.  
We find three main weaknesses in the state of the art. First, little attention has been 
paid to the use of semantic technologies to represent safety standards, thus its benefits 
(e.g. automatic reasoning) have been barely studied. Second, the proposed 
technologies have focused on specific aspects of the standards, namely their activities 
and terminology. Compliance however requires the consideration of more aspects [2], 
e.g. artefacts to manage and relationships between them. Therefore, no proposal has 
been made yet that provides an integrated ontological representation. Third, the 
semantic technologies adopted in the literature are seldom or not used in industry for 
critical systems engineering, which results in a gap between research and practice. We 
are not aware of any company using OWL or Protegé in real projects, and related 
studies on the state of the practice [1][7] do not provide evidence of their use. 
We are working towards addressing these issues by investigating how Knowledge 
Manager [8] (KM) can be used to represent safety standards and later exploit the 
resulting representation. KM is a tool used in industrial environments for critical 
systems engineering to represent domain knowledge with ontologies. These 
ontologies cover several aspects, from system terminology to system specification 
patterns, and can be used for different purposes, e.g. system specification, system 
artefact quality analysis, and system information reuse. KM usage in practice focuses 
on system-specific characteristics, e.g. system structure, but we argue that such usage 
can be extended to support compliance with safety standards. 
This position paper presents our initial work on the representation of safety 
standards with KM. We use as a basis an existing holistic generic metamodel to 
specify safety compliance needs [2]. We describe how the compliance information in 
a safety standard can be specified with KM according to the metamodel. This requires 
both a specific configuration of KM and the subsequent specification of the 
compliance information in KM. We further discuss how the resulting representation 
could be exploited to facilitate compliance with safety standards and related activities. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our proposal and 
Section 3 discusses it. Section 4 summarises our main conclusions. 
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2 Proposal to Represent Safety Standards with KM 
Our proposal to represent safety standards with semantic technologies is based on two 
main elements: KM, as supporting approach and tool for semantic specification of a 
standard’s information, and a holistic generic metamodel for the specification of 
safety compliance needs. The metamodel indicates the element types that must be 
considered when having to demonstrate compliance with safety standards, as well as 
the relationships between them. The overall purpose of our proposal is to provide 
guidance about how a standard’s terminology, data items of the element types, and 
relationships between the items can be represented with KM. 
An excerpt of the metamodel is shown in Fig. 1. The metamodel supports the 
specification of the different types of safety compliance needs: information about 
safety assurance requirements, artefacts, and activities, and about their applicability. 
This also includes additional information about roles, techniques, artefact attributes, 
artefact relationships, and relationships between the element types. All the classes in 
the metamodel specialise Reference Element, and Reference Activity, Reference 
Artefact, Reference Role, and Reference Technique specialise Constrained Reference 
Assurable Element. Further information about the metamodel can be found in [2].  
 
 
Fig. 1. Excerpt of the metamodel for the specification of safety compliance needs [2] 
 
Fig. 2 shows the structure of an ontology in KM. An ontology consists of several 
layers, each depending on and extending the semantic information of the inner layer. 
The most inner layer (Terminology) corresponds to the terms of a domain together 
with their syntactic information. Relationships between the terms can be specified in 
the Conceptual model layer, as well as their semantics with clusters; e.g. the 
semantics of the terms ‘car’ and ‘truck’ can be ‘system’, and they specialise ‘vehicle’. 
Patterns can then be developed to provide templates (aka boilerplates) for system 
information specification; the patterns refer to aspects of the two underlying layers. 
The Formalization layer includes information about how system information that 
matches a pattern will be semantically formalised and stored. Finally, at the Inference 
rules layer the data in all the other layers can be exploited for the specification of 
rules to derive new information, e.g. about the correctness of a system specification. 
At its current state, the proposal only deals with the Terminology and the Conceptual 
model layers. More information about these layers is provided in the next paragraphs 
when describing the proposal, and more information about KM is available in [8]. 
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Fig. 2. Ontology layers in KM 
 
The proposal consists of two main activities: KM configuration and specification 
of a standard’s information. Each activity consists of several steps, as we explain 
below. We have already applied the proposal for certain parts of DO-178C, EN 
50128, and ISO 26262. 
1. KM configuration. This activity is necessary to tailor the default KM usage to 
represent safety standards, i.e. certain aspects of KM must be configured so that a user 
can create a suitable representation in accordance with the holistic generic 
metamodel. The configuration focuses on those semantic aspects of the standards that 
must be included in the representation. These aspects are specific to safety standards 
but independent of the specific standard to represent. Two tasks must be performed. 
1.1 Specification of semantic clusters. New clusters must be added to the 
Conceptual model layer to be able to indicate the type of information that a term 
represents. First, a cluster with the name of the safety standard to be represented is 
necessary to later specify that a term falls within the scope of the standard. Second, 
semantic clusters must be added for Reference Artefact, Reference Artefact Attribute, 
Reference Activity, Reference Role, and Reference Technique, a cluster for each. 
These clusters are part of another new cluster called Reference Assurance 
Framework. The semantic clusters will be used to further categorise certain terms. 
1.2 Specification of relationship types. KM also supports the specification of 
relationship types between terms. To represent a safety standard, a relationship type 
has to be created for each association in the metamodel between the metaclasses for 
which the new clusters have been added, e.g. for ‘user-inputArtefact’ between 
Reference Activity and Reference Artefact. This does not apply to the compositions, 
e.g. between Reference Artefact and Reference Artefact Attribute. KM has a 
predefined relationship type for composition, as well as for specialisation (to specify 
e.g. taxonomies) and for equivalence (to specify e.g. synonyms), among others. 
Another relationship type called ‘Reference Artefact Relationship’ must be added to 
be able to relate different Reference Artefacts in KM. The specification of the 
relationship types also includes the specification of the roles of the relationship ends. 
2. Specification of a standard’s information. This activity results in the specific 
representation of a given safety standard. Two tasks can be distinguished. The tasks 
will usually be executed iteratively to incrementally represent a safety standard. 
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2.1 Specification of a standard’s terminology. This task has two main aspects to 
address. First, most standards have some glossary or vocabulary section. The 
corresponding terms and definitions, abbreviations, and acronyms must be added to 
the Terminology. Each time a term is added, it is necessary to (1) specify its syntactic 
category (e.g. noun or acronym) and (2) associate it with the semantic cluster that 
corresponds to the name of the standard; e.g. the term ‘algorithm’ would be added as 
a DO-178C noun. Next, the text of the standard must be analysed to identify terms 
that correspond to Reference Artefact, Reference Artefact Attribute, Reference 
Activity, Reference Role, or Reference Technique. Each time a term is identified, it is 
added to the Terminology and, in addition to the clusters for the glossary terms, the 
semantic cluster of the element type is associated; e.g. ‘Software Requirements Data’ 
is a DO-178C noun that also corresponds to a Reference Artefact. 
2.2. Specification of the conceptual model of a safety standard. Once all the 
relevant terms have been introduced and classified, relationships between them can be 
specified in the Conceptual model. These relationships will be classified according to 
the available relationship types in KM, both the default ones and those created during 
KM configuration. A user must conform to the holistic generic metamodel when 
specifying relationships, i.e. only terms that correspond to the ends of a given 
association in the metamodel must be related. For example, ‘Software Requirements 
Data’ is an ‘output’ of ‘Software Requirements Process’ in DO-178C. 
The user also needs to decide whether the relationships between Reference 
Artefacts should be specified as specialisations, as compositions, or with the 
Reference Artefact Relationship type. It is also possible to define specialisations of 
this relationship type if a user decides so, e.g. because it is a recurrent Reference 
Artefact Relationship. For instance, it is common that artefacts have to ‘conform to’ 
some plan or standard. Finally, it can also be necessary to specify specialisation and 
equivalence relationships between terms; e.g. ‘MC/DC’ and ‘Modified Condition/ 
Decision Coverage’ are equivalent for DO-178C. 
Fig. 3 shows part of the resulting representation for DO-178C. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example of specification of a standard’s information with KM 
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3 Discussion 
Once the proposal has been described, this section discusses how the representation of 
a safety standard with KM can be exploited for specific safety assurance and 
certification purposes. Within the overall purpose of demonstrating alignment or 
compliance with a safety standard, we currently envision six main possibilities to take 
advantage of the representations. 
a) Quality analysis of the text of a safety standard. KM is part of a tool suite [8] 
that supports, among other features, system artefact quality analysis, including textual 
artefacts. More concretely, the suite can analyse artefact correctness, completeness, 
and consistency. Considering the text of a safety standard as an example of artefact, 
its text quality could be determined. This would be valuable because text quality is 
one of the most often weaknesses that practitioners find in safety standards. Parts that 
could be better specified or should be clarified could be identified. 
b) System specification alignment. When specifying information for a specific 
system or analysing the information, the degree to which the specification is aligned 
with a given standard could be assessed. First, the system could be specified, e.g. its 
system requirement, according to patterns that refer to the semantic clusters added or 
to standard-specific terms. Second, an ontology of the system could be linked to the 
ontology of the standard, e.g. to specify that a given part of the system corresponds to 
the DO-178C component concept. 
c) Compliance assessment. An ontology of a safety standard created with KM 
could be used to assess process and product compliance. The tool suite capabilities 
could be used to compare process or product information with the ontology, in order 
to determine compliance gaps. The information could correspond to artefacts of 
different nature: textual specifications, documents, diagrams, spreadsheets…  
d) Comparison of standards. The text or ontology of a safety standard could be 
compared with the ontology of another, in order to identify commonalities and 
differences. This usage can be regarded as an extension of (a) and is similar to [3]. 
e) Reuse of compliant system information. If a system’s information (e.g. a 
system model) is linked with the ontology of a safety standard to declare compliance 
with the standard, it would be possible to search for compliant system information 
and, when found, to reuse it. It could even be possible to analyse system information 
reuse between safety standards if the ontologies of the different standards are linked. 
The linking of a system’s information with the ontology could be based on (b). 
f) Specification of standard-specific metrics. Specific metrics could be designed 
within the Inference rules layer based on the semantic information of a safety standard 
represented in KM. The metrics could assess (1) general compliance with the standard 
(e.g. the amount of Reference Artefacts that have been provided) and (2) artefact-
specific characteristics that a standard defines (e.g. architecture specification 
consistency). Although the metrics would often not be directly declared in the safety 
standard (e.g. for the latter example), the standards’ information would drive their 
definition by indicating the areas for which metrics could be designed and possible 
aspects to consider. 
We do not provide further details about the exploitation possibilities due to page 
limitations. How these possibilities can be finally enacted is part of our ongoing and 
future work, which might include the exploitation of further benefits. 
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4 Conclusion 
The use of explicit structured representations of safety standards has been proposed to 
facilitate compliance with the standards, and semantic technologies can be used to 
create such representations. However, further work on the topic is necessary, and it 
must be linked with and based on industrial practices.  
This position paper has presented our initial work towards representing safety 
standards with semantic technologies already used in industrial environments. We 
have described how to create ontologies of safety standards with the Knowledge 
Manager (KM) tool, and according to a holistic generic metamodel to specify safety 
compliance needs. The proposal consists of two main activities: KM configuration 
and specification of a standard’s information. We currently envision six main usage 
scenarios: quality analysis of the text of a safety standard, system specification 
alignment, compliance assessment, comparison of standards, reuse of compliant 
system information, and specification of standard-specific metrics. 
The proposal represents a novel usage of KM and an attempt towards bridging the 
gap, for safety assurance purposes, between the benefits that semantic technologies 
can enable and how they are used in critical systems engineering practice. 
The proposal is at an initial stage and further work is necessary to fully develop it. 
We plan to enact the usages presented in Section 3, which might allow us to identify 
improvement opportunities. The new capabilities that KM will have in the future (e.g. 
libraries of ontologies) can also enable further usages. Finally, the work is being 
performed within the scope of AMASS (http://amass-ecsel.eu/), which is a large 
H2020-ECSEL industry-academia project on assurance and certification of cyber-
physical systems. We will thus be able to apply the proposal in industrial case studies. 
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